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Abstract 
Those seeking to engage in warfare against organised governments in 
the 21st century are increasingly relying on such governments being 
unable to respond in an appropriate manner. The latter half of the 20th 
century in Northern Ireland is a perfect example of a ruling authority 
modifying its approach to the security issues it was confronted by 
throughout the conflict. “The Troubles”, as the three decades of 
guerrilla warfare has now become known, was dealt with by the 
British establishment through three specific policies – all of which 
saw changes implemented during the first ten years of the landmark 
conflict. These were: the implementation of Direct Rule, the so-called 
“Normalisation” of asymmetric warfare, and the reliance on the local 
paramilitaries over the British Army. All of these policies can be seen 
to have failed in particular ways, although careful examination shall 
explain the logic behind these shifts in British reactionary policy and 
their effects in the regions of the province of Ulster affected by the 
conflict. Being a very brief survey of this conflict, this paper does not 
address other policies enacted – nor does it encompass every aspect 
of the evidence available. It merely aims to act as an overview.  
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‘The present conflict between the opposing forces in Ireland has its 
roots in the failure of English statecraft and administration to rule 
Ireland.’ – G.K. Cockerill, Memorandum on Ireland 1919-20 
(Cockerill Papers in Hopkinson, 2004). 
Although written half a century before the thirty-year conflict between 
the Irish Republican Army and the British forces threatened to engulf 
Northern Ireland, these words of a British Conservative MP were to 
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remain ever relevant. With faults beginning to appear in Ulster’s 
Parliamentary apparatus, an economic pressure to abandon dying 
trades, and a resurgent unionist movement led by Ian Paisley, the 
Northern Irish government was still dependent on the United 
Kingdom for power and legitimacy (McKittrick and McVea, 2002). 
A brief period of peace and stability enjoyed in the 1960s soon gave 
rise to the civil rights marches – and the campaigns for an end to the 
sectarian discrimination and violence gained impetus. By 12th August 
1969, hundreds of civilians had been wounded in what was now 
termed the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ (Smith, 2002, pp. 78-9); two days 
later, the British Army was called in to Belfast and Londonderry. 
Warfare is increasingly taking an asymmetric tone in the 21st century; 
an understanding of this period of Northern Irish history is therefore 
ever more crucial in understanding the methods that a government 
may use to tackle such warfare. As one of the first examples of the 
more modern trend towards this style of warfare, there are lessons to 
be learned from the governmental response to the problems which 
arose throughout. Therefore, this brief study shall identify and assess 
three key methods which the British establishment used in its 
approach to the security issues in Northern Ireland during the first 
decade of this truly asymmetric conflict.  
Context to the Troubles 
For those reading without knowledge of this period of recent history, 
it is worth clarifying what is meant by the term “The Troubles”. The 
thirty year stretch of history in Northern Ireland referred to by this 
name was a period of guerrilla warfare which took place between the 
two sides in the region’s political landscape, concerning the future of 
Britain’s role in its governance. The Republican cause was for 
Northern Ireland to secede, and to join the Republic of Ireland; the 
Unionist cause was for Northern Ireland to remain tied to the United 
Kingdom. Along with the partisan nature of the issue, the religious 
dimension further exacerbated the already fraught situation; 
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traditionally Catholic communities of Ulster were mostly in favour of 
uniting with its cultural and geographic neighbours to the south, whilst 
traditionally Protestant communities were mostly in favour of 
remaining tied to Britain (Kelly, 2018). A complex socio-political 
climate, and one which is owed far more explanation than can be 
granted here. However, hopefully this summary has aided the readers 
in their understanding.  
Above, it has been decided to name the Battle of the Bogside as the 
starting point in the conflict: it is usually accepted that the main 
hostilities ended with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 but, with 
so much of the conflict to analyse if taken up until that point, it has 
been decided to restrict this analysis to the first decade alone. 
An explanation of the factions involved is also necessary. The cause 
for Irish Republicanism, and secession from the United Kingdom, was 
mainly championed by three factions – the Official IRA (OIRA), the 
Provisional IRA (PIRA or Provos), and the Irish National Liberation 
Army (NLA). All three aimed to force the UK government to enact a 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland, however, their methods differed. 
The OIRA had acted as stewards on the civil rights marches and so, 
frustrated with the lack of action, the PIRA had formed their own 
faction (Yardley, 1996). The OIRA did continue to carry out violence, 
but specifically against British troops. The Provos and NLA did also 
attack those serving under British command, but regularly would 
cause civilian deaths in addition to the military casualties; 
approximately a third of the deaths inflicted by the IRA were non-
military (Lavery, 2002).  
The Unionist forces were initially led by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), the state police of Northern Ireland, and then 
the British Army, when they were deployed onto the streets of 
Londonderry. The latter was then supported by the formation of a 
local regular regiment, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). 
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However, local paramilitaries were also founded, who mainly carried 
out attacks on Irish Catholic civilians, with a mixture of organisations 
such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA). Both were deemed illegal for large parts of the 
Troubles (Bruce, 1992, pp. xi-xiv).  
The word Westminster will be used throughout this paper and is used 
to refer to a number of organisations within the British government 
itself. However, it chiefly refers to the British Cabinet, the British 
Parliament, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and the 
Northern Ireland Department of the Home Office based in London. 
This is as opposed to the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, the 
Ulster base of the Northern Ireland Department of the Home Office, 
and the series of devolved assemblies, parliaments, and executives 
based in Ulster – these are mostly referred to as the Ulster 
Establishment, or Stormont. Owing to the fact that it was the Prime 
Minister of Northern Ireland, James Chichester-Clark, who requested 
the intervention of the British Army in 1969 (Sanders, 2018, p. 659), 
this position has been included in the latter category. 
Local Governance 
The British government’s approach to Northern Ireland changed 
throughout the Troubles, but particularly in the 1970s was this 
modified policy most apparent. In particular, Westminster’s attitude 
towards self-governance in Ulster rapidly reversed in the opening 
years of the conflict.  
The initial assumption that the Northern Irish Parliament alone could 
handle the tide of nationalist feeling surging through the region, and 
that the Royal Ulster Constabulary was fit for purpose to contain the 
worst of the rioting, was dispelled almost immediately when the 
Taoiseach Jack Lynch stated that the Irish government ‘can no longer 
stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse’ and 
asked for the British government to assemble a peacekeeping force in 
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conjunction with the UN (Byrne et al., 1982, p. 450). The British 
Army was sent in the following day. They were initially welcomed as 
an impartial arbiter of peace and, with the Provos unpopular in the 
Catholic communities they claimed to be protecting, it wasn’t until 
mid-1970 that the Army’s popularity diminished in the region. This 
was, in part, due to their countering of the actions of the PIRA: ‘many 
innocent bystanders’ (Wichert, 1994, p. 121) were caught in the 
crossfire. 
However, in 1972 Westminster took an irreversible step, and 
explicitly made the change in their policy clear. The Northern Ireland 
(Temporary Provisions) Act was passed in March 1972 – the 
Stormont Parliament was indefinitely suspended, and the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom formally assumed ‘full and direct 
responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland’ (Bell, 1994, 
p. 306). This action by the British Government, of becoming the de 
jure state establishment in Northern Ireland, is what will now be 
referred to as Direct Rule. The following summer the Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act officially abolished the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland in favour of an Executive to be chosen by the recently 
founded, and elected, Assembly and declared that the region should 
not cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without a referendum 
(Byrne et al., 1982, p. 462). The decision had been arguably taken not 
to submit in the face of terrorism and was quickly reinforced with 
legal framework; the Northern Irish Assembly had brought about a 
forum for discussion, and a potential method for promoting self-
governance. It is important to understand, however, that direct rule 
was still not entirely being considered. The failings of the local 
government had not yet required such a drastic intervention in the 
region. 
In early 1973 the British government made a proposal for a power-
sharing executive organisation, whereby Westminster would retain 
the majority of its de jure power, whilst the Northern Irish Assembly, 
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the Dáil Éireann, and the Northern Irish Executive would act in an 
advisory capacity. In December, the Sunningdale Agreement 
officially enacted an agreed power-sharing government, based on the 
above proposal – Nationalists and Unionists would operate the 
Government of Northern Ireland together. Yet by March 1974 loyalist 
paramilitaries and politicians, represented by the United Ulster 
Unionist Council (UUUC), had made it clear how unequivocal their 
opposition to the compromise was; the fear of the steps to a United 
Ireland was palpable (Smith, 2002, p. 106). With a General Strike 
enacted by Unionist workers at the beginning of May, Sunningdale 
collapsed by the end of the month. Less than eight weeks later, the 
Northern Ireland Act 1974 dissolved the Assembly and gave all its 
executive power to the Privy Council. Home Rule was over – from 
now on, Westminster would decide Ulster’s fate.  
How effective this policy change was is a complex debate. At first, 
the trust placed in the regional government gave rioters the initiative; 
the RUC was forced to deploy riot police and armoured cars, in 
response to a concerted campaign of petrol bombing vehicles and 
officers alike and forcing Catholic and Protestant families to flee their 
homes (English, 2004). Their ‘heavy-handed and violent’ approach 
was even captured on film by a Republic of Ireland news crew 
(Wharton, 2009, p. 41). The damage done then forced the regular 
army to be sent in, and it was at this point, with violence unavoidable, 
that the British government was arguably forced to make efforts to 
achieve peace before the bloodshed escalated further. Clearly the 
initial attempts at appeasement had failed to satisfy both Unionists and 
Republicans. This left Westminster facing a protracted guerrilla war 
fought by either the local police forces, or the trained British Army; 
and was to be organised by a regional government with little 
experience in crowd control, or the British establishment. 
The decision to impose Direct Rule was therefore the only clear 
pathway. The Northern Irish government was not in a position to act 
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as a self-regulatory body, and with the Sunningdale Agreement (a 
compromise designed to maintain a Unionist majority in the 
Executive) in tatters thanks to Unionist opposition, Westminster 
decided that it would have to take unilateral control of the Ulster 
executive establishment. This led to consequences for both the 
situation, and the region. Consequences which could have been 
avoided if the Unionist representatives were willing to compromise; 
it is likely this unwillingness to accept anything less than total victory 
is what prevented the conflict from resolving earlier than the late 
1990s. British troops had ceased to be merely peacekeepers, and 
instead became the representatives on the ground of a regime seen to 
be preventing the ‘unity of Catholic, Protestant and dissenter under 
the common banner of Irishman’ (Alonso, 2007, pp. 38-9), and 
therefore the enemy. This divided communities, and military action 
was therefore required to prevent the divisions worsening and the 
Republican movement gaining traction with erstwhile Unionists. The 
issue of religion was thrust to the fore of the issue; British troops, in 
combating violence from the Catholic Republicans, began to inflict 
more collateral damage on the Catholic communities which the 
combatants came from. However, the steps to direct rule did begin to 
establish the future solution – in the 1990s, as the peace agreement 
was being negotiated, it was decided to re-establish the Assembly of 
Northern Ireland. Two decades later, the decision made in the early 
1970s formed the basis for peace. 
Normalising the Violence 
Another major shift in not only policy, but socialisation, of the 
Troubles both in Britain and Ulster was the gradual efforts to 
normalise the situation. The failure of the British government to win 
over popular support in Northern Ireland, coupled with the attacks on 
civilians bringing the army into disrepute, led to the acceptance that 
the problems facing the security services were determined to maintain 
their presence. To ensure the continued running of day-to-day life in 
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the region, several key decisions were made in Westminster to return 
the judicial proceedings to their early settings. This specifically is of 
note regarding the abolition of the internment of suspected IRA 
members without trial, an action which even the Americans had 
termed a ‘mess’ and had contributed to a lack of appetite for US 
intervention (MacLeod, 2012, p. 35); and the initial attempts by 
British troops to protect jurors from intimidation, prior to the 
introduction of the Diplock courts in 1973 (Peterkin, 2006).   
This normalisation was furthered by the efforts made to ‘criminalise 
the violent aspects’ (Wichert, 1994, p. 177) of the Troubles which 
began to occur throughout the early to mid-1970s. Although mostly 
through work of the British government, this was supported 
immensely by the efforts of the pacifist movements. This in particular 
is exemplified by the work of Betty Williams, Máiréad Corrigan, and 
Ciarán McKeown – co-founders of The Community for Peace People. 
Inspired by witnessing the deaths of three children in August 1976, 
Williams began to hold rallies and marches in her quest to bring an 
end to the violence plaguing her community. By December, not only 
had she accrued upwards of 15,000 supporters, she had also been 
given £200,000 for her efforts by a peace convention in Norway 
(Byrne et al., 1982, p. 472). Williams and Corrigan were given that 
year’s Nobel Peace Prize, although, whether this is a judgement of 
success in and of itself is a separate question. This growing support 
for any cessation of hostilities led to a number of ceasefires being 
instituted. In 1972, the British government accepted an offer from the 
PIRA to carry out talks in Chelsea between William Whitelaw and an 
Irish Republican team. Whitelaw later commented that the ‘absurd 
ultimatums’ given by the Irish would never have been met: their 
demand for a unilateral withdrawal of British forces from Ulster was 
met with disdain, and within days the ceasefire had been broken 
(Whitelaw, 1989, in English, 2004, p. 158; Casciani, 2003). It is still 
unclear who was responsible for the ending of the ceasefire.  
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Two years later, another truce was brokered by the PIRA, with the 
exception of the January bombings in 1975, this lasted until the 
following year when ten Protestant workers were ambushed and killed 
(Hennessey, 1997, pp. 255-6). Again, an assumption was made by the 
Republicans that the British were prepared to withdraw troops, which 
arguably led to the failure of the truce. Yet, both sides were willing to 
talk. After half a decade of conflict, the British and IRA were still 
prepared to discuss a solution to the problem.  
The effectiveness of this campaign of normalisation can be clearly 
seen. Hostilities continued, and every attempt at a truce failed during 
this period. The only successful ceasefire enacted was by the OIRA, 
and was maintained for the remainder of the Troubles. In this sense, 
the attempts made to resume normal life had failed dismally – it could 
even be argued that they had, instead, entrenched the violence in the 
lives of those living in Ulster even further. 1971 saw 130 bombs 
exploded, and in 1972 more than 10,000 incidents involving shootings 
took place; with 2000 dead by the end of the decade, the conflict was 
far from over (Beckett and Chandler, 1996, pp. 350-1; Sutton, online). 
Of particular focus when studying these statistics is the casualty rate 
for the British soldiers and Loyalist paramilitaries - the Irish 
Republican forces inflicted more damage than any other single group, 
and they showed no signs of letting up by 1979. This famously 
climaxed with Lord Mountbatten’s assassination. This is clear 
evidence that the objective of reconstruction of the region had not 
been achieved on either side – and was not going to be.  
One can also look to the Rees Constitutional Convention in 1975 for 
further evidence of a situation with no hope for reconciliation or return 
to the past. When elections were held to the convention, the UUUC 
took a slim majority and, buoyed by their domination of 10 of the 11 
Westminster parliamentary seats the following year, were out for a 
majority Unionist rule (McKittrick and McVea, 2002, p. 112). The 
Republicans were in such a minority that, when the Convention 
Rory Butcher 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and 
Warfare Volume 1, Issue 2 
 
 
Page 10 
closed, the report was entirely Unionist in origin (McKittrick and 
McVea, 2002, p. 114). Westminster was unable to accept such a 
conclusion and, with no chance of implementing power-sharing 
following the collapse of Sunningdale, the possibility of a return to a 
peaceable Northern Irish society was reducing daily. 
The Use of Military Force 
The last major change in policy enacted by the British government 
during this period has to be the use of the British Armed Forces, and 
the increasing reliance on local paramilitaries and local soldiers as the 
conflict wore on. As discussed above, the initial shock of the violence 
had required the British Army to be sent in to Ulster to act as 
peacekeepers and later riot control, codenamed Operation Banner – at 
its peak in the numbers of British troops deployed reached as many as 
22,000 (Bennett, 2013, p. 278). The RUC failed to adequately contain 
the violence in Derry, instead allowing the action to escalate into a 
“battle”, and further deploying armoured cars. The use of the quasi-
paramilitary B Specials, hated for their anti-Catholic fervour, further 
contributed to the sectarian flavour to the conflict; this led to their 
abolition shortly after (Morgan, 1992, p. 291). In fact, it could be 
argued that in the first crucial months, it would have been unwise to 
not bring in British troops.  
The resources brought to bear by this deployment meant combating 
the bombing campaigns of a determined Republican foe became far 
more achievable – the redevelopment of intelligence and training, 
twinned with the direct challenge to IRA controlled “no-go” areas, 
through Operation Motorman and the precedent it set, meant that 
gradually the Republican forces began to lose the fight (Beckett and 
Chandler, 1996, p. 351). Yet not soon enough, as the area soon 
became known as the most dangerous deployment globally for a 
British soldier. 
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This led to the commencement of the “Ulsterisation” of Operation 
Banner, particularly regarding the increasing actions of paramilitaries. 
Whilst not employed by the government, these groups, such as the 
UVF and UDA, were popular amongst those serving on the front line, 
and politicians. One British officer remarked that ‘a lot of what they 
do is illegal…but since they took over there hasn’t been a single bomb 
at all in their area’, with even Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian 
Faulkner discussing a code of practice to ensure their constructive co-
operation with regular forces (Bruce, 1992, pp. 47-8). This allowed 
the police to focus on crowd control, and the army to focus on counter-
insurgency. The other major shift in this campaign of re-establishing 
local forces at the heart of the Unionist cause was the foundation of 
the Ulster Defence Regiment in early 1970, with a battalion formed 
for each county, and one for Belfast. Many of those who enlisted were 
former members of the B Specials, or the Territorial Army, with over 
6,000 enlisting by the end of the year (HMSO, 2004, p. 130). 
How effective was this introduction of Northern Irish fighters? The 
UDA, while popular amongst local people, was considered dangerous 
by British authorities. The armed wing of the Association was banned 
in 1973; the only other major Unionist paramilitary, the UVF, which 
been deemed illegal in the 1960s, had been reformed by Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees to enable the group to 
contribute to any peace settlement… only to be banned again less than 
12 months later (Byrne et al., 1982, p. 463; Bruce, 1992, pp. 117-9). 
The illegal practises referred to above also had their consequences. 
Not only did the violence carried out by the paramilitaries antagonise 
local populations even further than the British military had – leading 
to the creation of ‘barricaded areas’ behind which the IRA had 
complete control (Leahy, 2015, p. 47) – but by specifically breaking 
the law in Army occupied areas some became enemies of the British 
military. One example is the pseudo-war fought over control of 
Shankill Road in Belfast: ‘Loyalist paramilitaries were beaten up, 
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UDA clubs were raided, and money ‘confiscated’… several soldiers 
were convicted of stealing from Loyalist-controlled businesses and 
committing other robberies’ (Burke, 2015, pp. 666-7). This 
adversarial situation did not endear either the British squaddies or the 
Loyalist fighters to the locals. 
With regards to the Ulster Defence Regiment, despite the fact that 
only one of these battalions ever accrued full strength completely, 
they were a vital component of the British military response. The 
experience many of them had already in either the police, or army, 
coupled to their local knowledge and personal stake in the restoration 
of peace, allowed the unit to project British interests into areas whilst 
still ensuring that local people did not feel threatened by a “foreign” 
and hostile force. The initial presence of Catholic recruits, up to half 
in some areas, further enhanced the intention of the unit as a 
replacement to the heavily sectarian B Specials – although after the 
introduction of internment without trial the numbers heavily 
plummeted (Keegan, 2002).  
The important contribution the Regiment made was in allowing the 
British Army to begin to de-escalate its own involvement. The US had 
been becoming concerned that the UK would be unable to fulfil its 
required NATO contributions since 1972, and the amount of military 
intervention in Ulster had drawn criticism from Washington and from 
Dublin (MacLeod, 2012, pp. 45-6). In a conflict where the IRA 
supposedly aimed to inflict more casualties than the Army had 
suffered in Aden, and thereby force Westminster to withdraw, every 
British casualty was a victory for the Republicans. Therefore, the 
increasing use of ‘home-grown’ peacekeepers robbed the IRA of their 
righteousness – no longer were they fighting against an evil colonial 
regime, but instead targeting their neighbours (Smith, 2002, p. 114). 
The “Ulsterisation” of the conflict was an integral aspect of 
Westminster policy, and began to set the cultural tone for a restoration 
of Home Rule. 
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To Conclude 
The Troubles remain to this day an exemplar both of when political 
discussion breaks down due to civil unrest, and of how a mismanaged 
military situation can quickly escalate the problems faced by troops 
on the ground. As in line with most previous British military 
experience putting down rebellions, in the 1970s the Ulster and British 
military establishment failed significantly in an accurate assessment 
of the threat. However, these failures were specific to the area in that 
both the initial assumption that local law enforcement would control 
the problem, and the later deployment of British troops to act as 
merely peacekeepers in a conflict which had quickly dissolved to 
counter-insurgency. The overcompensation in response to rioting and 
low-level paramilitary activity led to one of the largest deployments 
in post-1945 British military history, and a campaign so long and 
protracted that it only ended after thirty-eight years, and with over 
300,000 personnel having been sent to the region (McKittrick, 2007). 
It also, more importantly, claimed the lives of over 3500 people – with 
over half the damage done in the first decade (Dixon, 2001, p. 24; 
Sutton, online).  
However, the elongation of this troubled period in Northern Irish 
history cannot be solely attributed to British Parliamentary policy. 
Westminster’s approach always had the swift end of the conflict at 
heart: direct rule was the last resort of a government with little idea of 
how else to maintain the everyday running of the region; the attempts 
made to return Ulster to normal life before the violence had fully 
ended may not have been intentionally malicious; and the increasing 
desire to use local troops over British squaddies did help to reduce 
PIRA attacks, through fear of hurting their own people. 
 So, in these respects, the solutions offered to the problem were 
offered in search of a peaceful resolution as soon as possible. But as 
seen, they did fail on a number of levels to reduce the impact of the 
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Troubles – and they failed most by allowing civilians to be caught in 
the crossfire. The British Government’s policy changes were enacted 
with mixed intentions; yet sadly history has condemned them to act 
as lessons in failure, while conducting asymmetric warfare. 
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